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international outsourcing and the industry price-cost margin. The empirical results of a panel of 66
industries and the EU12 countries in the 1990s strongly confirm our theoretical hypotheses. Market
concentration and international outsourcing are positively related to industry price-cost margins. In a
thought experiment, we show that industry price-cost margins would have decreased by 0.4 percentage
points more in the 1990s, if international outsourcing had not changed since 1990. In addition,
international outsourcing accounts for a convergence in margins across industries in the last decade.
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1 Introduction1
We live in an age of outsourcing. (Grossman and Helpman, 2002b, p. 1) In recent years,
this phenomenon has become a key issue in the political and scientiÞc debate on possible
adverse consequences of globalization, thereby mainly focussing on wage and employment
eﬀects.2 However, despite the salient role of international outsourcing for modern indus-
trial production (Grossman and Helpman 2002b, 2003), an empirical assessment of the
relationship between international outsourcing and industrial economic measures, like the
price-cost margin, is so far missing in the literature. To close this gap is the purpose of
this paper.
Empirical research in industrial economics on the relationship between globaliza-
tion and price-cost margins has particularly focussed on the imports-as-market-discipline
(IMD) hypothesis. There is a well-established consensus that imports are a source of
competitive discipline, which seems robust to the choice of import competition measure
(Geroski and Jacquemin, 1981; de Ghellinck et al., 1988; Levinsohn, 1993; Katics and
Petersen, 1994; Co, 2001). The IMD hypothesis has been tested on both the Þrm level
(Levinsohn, 1993) and the industry level (Co, 2001), without distinguishing between Þnal
and intermediate goods imports. Since Þrm level data for price cost margins and the
required explanatory variables are not accessible for a large sample of countries and a suf-
Þciently long period, we stick to industry level information.3 Conveniently, import data
comprise both Þnal goods and intermediate goods (components). While the former may
be interpreted as a source of competitive pressure, we argue that access to foreign labor
markets and increased trade in intermediate goods may counteract this eﬀect. In fact, the
IMD hypothesis interprets all imports as Þnal goods imports, which is at odds with the
stylized facts on the composition of trade (Feenstra, 1998). Interpreting all imports as
1We are indebted in Nigel Driﬃeld, Michael Pfaﬀermayr and Laura Rondi for helpful comments and
suggestions.
2Arndt (1997), Deardorﬀ (2001), Egger and Egger (2001, 2003), Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Jones
(2000), Venables (1999).
3As Tybout (2003, p. 5) points out, import competition can only be observed at the industry level.
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Þnal goods ones could result in an underestimation of the importance of the IMD eﬀect
of Þnal goods. Moreover, assuming that intermediate goods imports (international out-
sourcing) exert the same impact as Þnal goods imports as in previous IMD studies may
be misleading. Accordingly, one would wish to decompose overall industry imports into
the two components, Þnal and intermediate goods, to obtain unbiased estimates for both
types of imports.
Previous research has pointed to an important nexus between industry price-cost mar-
gins, changing market concentration and multinationality.4 This paper provides Þrst
insights into the relationship between international outsourcing and industry price-cost
margins in a large cross-section of industries and EU countries in three years of the 90s.
Thereby, we understand international outsourcing in a broad sense including intra-Þrm
(Dunning, 1988, calls this the internalization strategy) and extra-Þrm (arms length)
cross-border sourcing of intermediate goods. In a theoretical model with multinationals
competing in quantities and other Þrms representing a competitive fringe, we analyse the
relationship between market concentration (of multinationals) or international outsourc-
ing on the one hand, and the price-cost margin of the industry on the other hand. In
such a model, multinationality per se does not exhibit any impact on price-cost margins
if markets are symmetric. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our theoretical
hypotheses using a panel of 66 manufacturing industries in the pre-1995 12 EU member
countries. Starting from the 5-digit trade statistics level, we are able to reclassify trade
data of the EU12 economies to NACE-3-digit data when distinguishing between Þnal and
intermediate goods trade. Our empirical Þndings are in accordance with our theoretical
hypotheses.
A thought experiment underpins the importance of international outsourcing for price-
cost margins in the EU. In the average low-PCM industry, price-cost margins would
have decreased 0.5 percentage points faster between 1991 and 1998, if outsourcing had
4See Martin (1993) for an overview and Davies and Lyons (1996), Lyons et al. (2001), Sleuwaegen
and Veugelers (2001) for applications in the context of EU integration. Chung (2001) and Co (2001)
investigate the relationship between foreign direct investment and markups/margins for US industries.
3
not changed since 1990. The reduction in the outsourcing activity of the high-margins
industries has led to an additional decrease in their margins by 0.1 percentage points over
the same period. In that way, cross-border sourcing behaviour has induced a convergence
in margins across industries within the EU12 area in the last decade.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 The Basic Model
We consider a model where n multinational Þrms compete on m markets with a given
number of Nj home producers, j = 1, ...,m. The latter form a competitive fringe and
can only serve their respective home market. The production technology of competitive
home producers is represented by a convex cost function of the form Cx (xj) = 12x
2
j , with
xj being the output of an individual Þrm active in market j and Cx (·) being identical
for all competitive Þrms both within and across markets. Noteworthy, competitive Þrms
do not have access to international outsourcing.5 Total production costs of multinational
Þrms C
³P
j qkj, a
k
O; s
´
depend on total Þrm output
P
j qkj and the degree of interna-
tional outsourcing akO = Ok/
³P
j qkj
´
, where Ok denotes the amount of intermediate
goods used in the production of multinational k.6 Parameter s captures all trade costs
induced by cross-border tansactions in the case of outsourcing. These costs include tar-
iﬀs, non-tariﬀ barriers and transport costs. We assume positive and increasing marginal
costs of producing output qk, i.e. ∂C (·) /∂
³P
j qkj
´
> 0 and ∂2C (·) /∂
³P
j qkj
´2
> 0,
respectively. Since international outsourcing means access to cheaper resources abroad,
we assume ∂C (·) /∂akO < 0 and ∂2C (·) /∂akO∂
³P
j qkj
´
< 0, where the latter assumption
5It is crucial for our analysis to distinguish between two types of Þrms regarding their outsourcing
opportunities. For analytical tractability, we choose the simplest possible set-up, where competitive Þrms
do not have access to international outsourcing. However, one may alternatively consider a model with
competitive and multinational Þrms being engaged in outsourcing but facing diﬀerent access costs to
foreign intermediate goods.
6Therefore, akO describes the factor input coeﬃcient of imported intermediate goods.
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implies that larger Þrms gain more from international outsourcing than smaller ones. In
addition, ∂2C (·) /∂ ¡akO¢2 > 0 seems appropriate, if the cost-saving advantage of inter-
national outsourcing is diﬀerent across production processes and Þrms try to outsource
those processes with the highest cost-saving advantage Þrst.7 Moreover, for the purpose
of analytical tractability we assume that production costs C (·) are linearly homogeneous
in the two arguments
P
j qkj and a
k
O.
8 Finally, there may also arise coordination costs
(not captured by C (·)) of linking diﬀerent production processes which, following Jones
and Kierzkowski (2001), are especially pronounced in the case of international outsourc-
ing.9 We hypothesize that coordination costs, denoted as τakO, depend on the degree
of international outsourcing rather than on the absolute value of imported intermediate
goods.
The inverse demand functions for the m markets are given by
pj = Aj − b (Qj +Xj) , j = 1, ...,m. (1)
Thereby, Qj ≡
P
k qkj is the aggregate output of all multinational Þrms in market j.
Xj ≡ Njxj denotes the overall output of competitive home producers. Use xj = pj,
according to Cx (xj) = 12x
2
j . Then, the proÞt maximization problem of multinational
Þrms is given by10
max
qk1,...qkm, a
k
O
πk =
mX
j=1
Aj − bQj
1 + bNj
qkj − C
Ã
mX
j=1
qkj, a
k
O; s
!
− τakO, (2)
7In contrast to the seminal paper of Grossman and Helpman (2002a) we do not formalize the decision
problem of Þrms with respect to in house production and outside purchases. Rather and as usual in the
trade literature dealing with international outsourcing, our focus lies on the cost-saving eﬀect induced by
the internationalization of production.
8Of course, the above mentioned properties of C (·) only hold for interior solutions, implying that at
least some of the intermediate goods are produced by the multinaltional Þrm at home.
9Compare also Jones (2000) for a discussion on the importance of service links and other coordina-
tion/communication costs. Glass and Saggi (2001) also introduce this type of costs.
10Due to the assumption of competitive home producers, multinational Þrms face demand curves of
the form
pj (1 + bNj) = Aj − bQj , j = 1, ...,m.
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according to (1). In the case of identical multinationals and symmetric markets, the
Þrst-order conditions for an interior solution (q > 0, aO > 0) are given by
A− b (n+ 1) q
1 + bN
− ∂C (mq, aO; s)
∂ (mq)
= 0 and (3)
∂C (mq, aO; s)
∂ (aO)
+ τ = 0, (4)
where qij = q, akO = aO, Aj = A and Nj = N have been used. The equilibrium concentra-
tion rate, measured as output of an individual multinational producer relative to market
output, and the price-cost margin of the industry are then given by
CR =
q (1 + bN)
nq +NA
and (5)
PCMind = n · CR · PCMmult, (6)
where X = Np and p = A−bnq
1+bN
have been used, according to (1) and the symmetry
assumptions. Moreover, PCMmult ≡ 1n|ε| , where ε ≡ −A−bnqbnq denotes the elasticity of
demand with respect to prices.
2.2 Comparative Static Analysis
In the following, we analyze how trade costs s, coordination costs τ , market access (multi-
nationality) m, the number of multinationals n and the number of competitive Þrms N
aﬀect output q, outsourcing coeﬃcient aO, concentration rate CR and price-cost margin
PCMind.
Proposition 1 If marginal production costs are increasing and the cost-saving advantage
induced by international outsourcing is decreasing in trade costs s, i.e. if ∂2C (·) /∂
³P
j qij
´
∂s
> 0 and ∂2C (·) /∂aiO∂s > 0, respectively, an increase in trade costs s as well as in coor-
dination costs τ lowers both outsourcing coeﬃcient aO and output q. Moreover, s as well
as τ has a negative impact on concentration rate CR and price-cost margin PCMind.
Proof. See the appendix.
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An increase in s (τ) implies that international outsourcing becomes less attractive, so
that multinationals tend to decrease their outsourcing activities. Since outsourcing makes
the production of output q more attractive, a decline in aO, implied by an increase in s (τ),
has a negative impact on the output of multinationals q. Be aware that trade costs s have
also a direct positive impact on C (·), according to ∂2C (·) ∂ (mq) ∂s > 0. Thus, output
q unambiguously decreases with s (τ). But, if the output of multinationals declines, the
output of competitive Þrms x increases due to a reduction in the competitive pressure.
According to the latter, a decline in output q not only reduces PCMmult, but also the
concentration rate CR. Since competitive Þrms sell their products at marginal costs, the
impact of trade costs s (coordination costs τ) on PCMind turns out to be unambiguously
negative.
The impact of multinationality m on the variables of interest is summarized by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 An increase in multinationality (market access) m increases outsourcing
coeﬃcient aO but has no impact on output q. Moreover and as a consequence, m has also
no impact on concentration rate CR and price-cost margin PCMind.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is the following. First, access to an additional market
at a given outsourcing coeﬃcient aO and a given output level at each individual market
q implies that unit production costs increase. Thus, a reduction of q becomes attractive.
This is a negative direct eﬀect. Second, access to an additional market at a given q makes
outsourcing more attractive so that the outsourcing coeﬃcient aO increases. However,
an increase in the outsourcing coeﬃcient aO reduces production costs C (·), which gives
an incentive to increase the output in each market q. This is a positive indirect eﬀect.
It turns out that both eﬀects exactly cancel out in equilibrium so that q is not aﬀected
by a change in multinationality m. Note thereby, that q is independent of m since the
outsourcing coeﬃcient aO is increasing in m. Moreover, since q is not aﬀected, it is clear
that a change in (market access) m neither has an impact on CR nor on PCMind.
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Of course, our Þnding that m does neither aﬀect CR nor PCMind critically depends
on two restrictive assumptions, namely that markets are symmetric and that access to an
additional market does not imply more competition due to an increase in the number of
multinationals n.
The impact of the number of multinationals n on aO, q, CR and PCMind is summarized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 An increase in the number of multinational Þrms n reduces both out-
sourcing coeﬃcient aO and output per market q. Moreover, concentration rate CR is
decreasing in the number of multinationals n, whereas the impact on the price-cost margin
of the industry PCMind is ambiguous.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for this Þnding is that an increase in the number of multinational Þrms
n reinforces competition, so that both q and aO decline. The latter eﬀect arises since a
decline in output q makes outsourcing less attractive, according to ∂
2C(·)
∂aO∂q
. The impact of
the Þrm number n on the concentration rate CR is negative, since individual output q
declines whereas market output nq +Nx increases. Concerning its impact on PCMmult,
n reveals two opposing eﬀects. First, an increase in n has a direct negative eﬀect on
PCMmult, according to PCMmult = 1/ (n |ε|). Second, nq increases in n implying that
the elasticity of demand with respect to prices |ε|, goes down. This is an indirect positive
eﬀect of the number of multinationals on PCMmult. Since in equilibrium Þrms are selling
at the elastic range of the demand function, i.e. n |ε| > 1, PCMmult turns out to be
unambiguously declining in the number of multinational Þrms n. Finally, be aware that
total output of multinationals nq increases at the expense of the production of competitive
suppliers Nx. Thus, n ·CR unambiguously increases with n, according to (5).11 Together
with dPCMmult/dn < 0, there are two opposing eﬀects of n on PCMind, according to
(6). Since it is not clear which of the two eﬀects is stronger, dPCMind/dn turns out to
be ambiguous.
11Be aware that d (n ·CR) /dn = [CR+ n · dCR/dn], with CR > −n · dCR/dn.
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Finally, the impact of the number of competitive Þrms N on the variables of interest
is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 An increase in the number of competitive Þrms N lowers both outsourcing
coeﬃcient aO and output q. Moreover, N has a negative impact on concentration rate CR
and the price-cost margin of the industry PCMind.
An increase in N implies a higher competitive pressure so that multinationals reduce
output q. As argued in the intuition for Proposition 3, this makes outsourcing activities
less attractive. Thus, also aO is negatively related to N . Due to its negative impact on
q, an increase in N also implies a decline in CR, since competitive Þrms increase their
output at the expense of multinational ones. Finally, since the economy becomes more
competitive, N reduces PCMmult so that PCMind is also decreasing in N .
2.3 Summary of the Theoretical Hypotheses
From our theoretical analysis above we would expect that an increase in international
outsourcing in terms of output of multinationals aO induced by a decline in trade costs s,
coordination costs τ or the number of national competitiors N goes along with an increase
in the concentration rate CR and the price-cost margin per industry PCMind. A decline
in the competitive pressure induced by a decrease in the number of multinationals n would
also increase both outsourcing coeﬃcient aO and concentration rate CR. However, the
impact of n on the price-cost margin per industry PCMind turns out to be ambiguous.
Finally, access to an additional market, i.e. an increase in m, is solely absorbed by an
increase in outsourcing coeﬃcient aO. Neither CR nor PCMind are aﬀected, since output
per market q turns out to be constant. However, as pointed out above, the Þnding that m
does neither aﬀect CR nor PCMind, may critically depend on our symmetry assumptions.
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3 Data and Empirical Results
To construct an empirical model, we build upon insights from our theoretical analysis
that price-cost margins per industry are only directly aﬀected by Þrm number n, while all
the other exogenous variables (s, τ ,m and N) impact on PCMind only through changes
of the concentration rate and the price-cost margin of multinationals (PCMmult), which
are directly related to changes of Þrm output q and (at least for a given m) outsourcing
coeﬃcient aO. Hence, in our empirical analysis we use CR5 (the concentration rate of
the top Þve Þrms with respect to their output in each industry) and aO as approximate
but observable measures of changes in the Þrm numbers (n or N , respectively), overall
trade costs s in a wide sense and coordination costs τ .12 In addition, we control for
multinationality, which may have an impact on price-cost margins in an asymmetric world
(not in the case of symmetric markets above). Finally, we know from our theoretical
investigation that the impact of multinationality m and the outsourcing coeﬃcient aO
on the one hand, and the concentration rate CR5 and aO on the other hand, are not
necessarily independent. Therefore, we should control for interactions of these two pairs.
In addition to the variables that are based on our theoretical considerations, we control
for further variables which may be related to price-cost margins, according to earlier
empirical Þndings. Motivated by Co (2001) and Levinsohn (1993), we use the investment-
to-output ratio (KO) to control for diﬀerences in margins due to capital intensity.13 The
Þnal goods import-to-output ratio (IMP ) is also used as an explanatory variable to
see whether the IMD hypothesis is still supported if we distinguish between Þnal and
intermediate goods imports. As suggested by Co (2001), we also control for the possible
12We cannot control for the direct impact of Þrm number n, since no data is available for this variable.
Similarly, data on trade and coordination costs are partly unobserved and usually aﬀected by substantial
measurement errors (see Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2003).
13Fors (1997) and Griliches (1998) illustrate that investment to output ratios are good approximations
of changes in capital stocks. For some Þrm-level data bases, capital stocks are available from balance
sheets (see Konings and Vandenbussche, 2002). Unfortunately, information on capital stocks is not
available at the industry level.
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interaction between the concentration rate CR5 and the Þnal goods import-to-output
ratio IMP .
We estimate two-way Þxed eﬀects regressions, which account for Þxed time and country-
industry eﬀects in order to control for unobserved cycle and cross-section speciÞc inßu-
ences, thereby reducing the possible omitted variable bias. The estimated speciÞcation
reads
PCMind,ijt = β0 + β1KOijt + β2mi(t−1) + β3mi(t−2) + β4CR5i(t−1) + β5IMPij(t−1)
+ β6CR5i(t−1) · IMPij(t−1) + β7aOij(t−1) + β8mi(t−1)aOij(t−1) + β9CR5i(t−1)aOij(t−1)
+ µij + λt + εijt, (7)
where i = 1, ..., 66, j = 1, ..., 11 and t = 1991, 1994, 1998 are industry, country14 and year
indices, respectively. Martin (1979) and Geroski (1982) address the problem of potential
endogeneity in margins regressions. Martin (1979) suggests to account for a partial ad-
justment scheme. Given that we have only three data points in the time dimension of
each industry in a typical EU economy at hand, this is impossible in our case. Rather,
we follow Pirotte (1999) and interpret the Þxed eﬀects parameter estimates as valid ap-
proximations of the short run elasticities. Due to the lack of appropriate instruments,
we use lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables.15 Of course, this strat-
egy is only helpful for longitudinal panels of data. In cross-sections, the inclusion of
lagged values cannot help to overcome the endogeneity problem, and Martins (1979) and
Geroskis (1982) arguments apply. To be more precise, we use lagged CR5 and aO since
they are jointly determined with PCM in our theoretical model. Similarly, we use only
the lagged Þnal goods import-to-output ratio IMP and multinationality m. See Chung
14The EU member countries as of before 1995, where Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as a single
economy due to the availability of trade data: Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK.
15We may assume all lagged variables as predetermined, i.e., independent of subsequent structural
disturbances (a standard assumption in dynamic panel econometrics). Greene (1997, p. 714) argues that
variables that are predetermined in a model can be treated, at least asymptotically, as if they were
exogenous in the sense that consistent estimates can be obtained when they appear as regressors.
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(2001) for a similar approach in a diﬀerent setting. As motivated in Co (2001), we also
include mi(t−2) since the impact of multinationality on PCMind may be less immediate.
µij are Þxed country-industry eﬀects, which control for all unobserved country, industry
and country-by-industry eﬀects. Noteworthy, in this design pure country or industry ef-
fects are nested in µij, but µij additionally controls for country speciÞc deviations from
the average industry eﬀects, which may be due to legal, institutional, infrustructure and
other aspects.16 λt denotes Þxed time eﬀects to account for a common cyclical behavior
of margins (Domowitz et al., 1986), and εijt is a classical error term.
For the empirical assessment, we use data on gross production, value added, gross Þxed
capital formation and wages at the NACE 3-digit level from New Cronos (EUROSTAT)
for EU12 countries. As usual, we deÞne the PCMind by the Lerner index:
PCMind,ijt =
value addedijt − wagesijt
gross productionijt
. (8)
UN Broad Economic Categories distinguish between Þnal goods and intermediate goods
trade at the Standard International Trade ClassiÞcation (SITC) Revision 3 5-digit level.
Intermediate goods are components that are used in the production of other goods. Final
goods are all other products. We deÞne intermediate goods imports of the EU12 countries
from non-EU countries as our wide measure of outsourcing. The data are reclassiÞed to
NACE 3-digit following the available correspondence table. Due to data availability,
we cannot distinguish between international outsurcing of multinationals and of other
Þrms. However, as long as multinationals have easier access to foreign intermediate goods
markets, our measure of outsourcing seems appropriate for the empirical assessment. Data
on the EU12 market share of the largest Þve enterprises (CR5) and multinationality (m),
which is measured by the entropy index of production of the largest multinationals across
EU12 member countries, are from Davies and Lyons (1996) and Sleuwaegen and Veugelers
16In any estimated speciÞcation, we tested the model with pure country and industry eﬀects against
our nested model. The former is always rejected in terms of an F-test. Hence, a three-way Þxed eﬀects
approach with time, country and industry eﬀects is likely to attribute some eﬀect to observed variables,
which in fact is due to unobserved, time-invariant (legal, infrastructure, institutional, etc.) country-by-
industry speciÞc determinants of margins.
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(2001), available for 1987, 1993 and 1997. The entropy index measures the distribution
of production activities of (domestic and foreign) multinationals among EU12 countries.
For each Þrm in a speciÞc industry, the index is deÞned as
P
j −sj ln(sj), with sj denoting
country js production share in overall EU12 production.17 Hence, the index is maximized
as the distribution is uniform. Suppose that production plants are all of the same size,
and multinationals operate only a single plant in a country. Then, the index rises with
the number of markets the multinational operates in. Therefore, the index represents
a measure of multinationality. We use the industry average of the multinational Þrm-
speciÞc index values. The data are interpolated in order to obtain an estimate of CR5
and m for 1990, which is the Þrst year reliable trade data are available for. Since CR5
and multinationality are published in an aggregated form of NACE 3-digit (called SPES),
the industry and trade data are further reclassiÞed to SPES, too (see Sleuwaegen and
Veugelers, 2001). We exclude all country-industry observations from the analysis, which
are not observed at least twice in the three years under consideration and come up with
2020 observations in the regression analysis. The PCMind in 1991, 1994 and 1998 is
explained by contemporaneous explanatory variables (observed in 1991, 1994 and 1998)
and lagged (observed in 1990, 1993 and 1997) as well as twice-lagged variables (observed
in 1989, 1992 and 1996).
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the full sample and two subsamples.
The Þrst subsample18 consists of those industry-by-country pairings (ij) with an average
PCM higher than the overall mean (high PCM), and the second subsample are the other
pairings (low PCM). According to the table, the two subsamples signiÞcantly diﬀer not
only in terms of the PCMbut also of almost all explanatory variables. SpeciÞcally, the Þnal
goods imports to output ratio and outsourcing are higher for the low-PCM subsample,
while all other variables are signiÞcantly lower. These diﬀerences lead us to the suggestion
17In our data, the entropy index exhibits a minimum value of 0.14 for the casting, forging, and Þrst
treatment of metal industry and a maximum one of 0.83 for the dairy products industry. Average level
and standard deviation are given for the full sample and two subsamples in Table 1, below.
18To deÞne the subsamples, we average all data over time.
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that the impact of these variables on the industry PCM might also diﬀer between the two
subsamples. Accordingly, we run the regressions also for the two subsamples, separately.
> Table 1 <
Table 2 presents the results from nine regressions: Models 1-3 for the full sample
and two sub-samples. Model 1 corresponds to (7), and Models 2 and 3 are restricted
versions of (7). In Model 2, we assume that all interaction terms have zero impact (i.e.,
β6 = β8 = β9 = 0), and in Model 3 we additionally assume that Þnal goods imports
and outsourcing have the same impact (i.e., β5 = β7). However, for both the full sample
and the high-PCM subsample Models 2 and 3 are rejected against Model 1 on the basis
of an F-test. Only for the low-PCM subsample the more parsimonious models are not
rejected. According to the F-test of Model 3 against Model 2, the latter is supported in
all cases. Below, we base the further analysis and discussion on the Model 3 parameters
for both the full sample and the two subsamples. However, pooling of the parameters
for the low-PCM and the high-PCM subsamples in the full sample is rejected according
to an F-test. Therefore, the respective heterogeneous parameter estimates are relevant.
Note that the reported adjusted R2 Þgures are very high. The reason is that the µij (i.e.,
the industry-by-country dummy variables) account for a lot of variation in the data. Of
course the corresponding within R2 Þgures are considerably lower.19 However, they also
point to a good explanatory power of our model.
> Table 2 <
Because of the presence of interaction terms, the results in Table 2 do not allow for
direct conclusions on the marginal eﬀects. The required information can be obtained by
Þrst diﬀerencing (7) with respect to the variables of interest. Noteworthy, the marginal
impact varies across observations and it is usually evaluated at the sample means of the
19These Þgures indicate, how much of the variation in the data after subtracting the industry-by-country
means is explained by the explanatory variables.
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respective interacted variables.20 The positive average marginal impact of multinational
activity for the full sample or the high-PCM subsample is not signiÞcant after controlling
for market concentration and intra-Þrm components trade activity (internalization). This
is in accordance with our theoretical hypotheses. However, there is a signiÞcant positive
marginal eﬀect for the low-PCM subsample.21 In line with previous empirical work and
with our theoretical model, we identify a positive direct impact of lagged industry concen-
tration on margins. Similar to Cos (2001) result for the US, this impact is the lower, the
larger the industry (in our case: Þnal goods) imports (see interaction term (6) in Table 2).
On average, the marginal eﬀect of concentration is insigniÞcant. However, it is negative
and signiÞcant at 10% in the high-PCM subsample and insigniÞcant in the low-PCM sub-
sample, which cannot be explained by our theoretical model. There is evidence in favor of
the IMD hypothesis, since a marginal increase in Þnal goods imports signiÞcantly reduces
the industry PCM (see Co, 2001, Levinsohn, 1993, and Tybout, 2003, for an overview),
irrespective of which sample of the data is considered. We Þnd that it is important to
distinguish between Þnal goods imports and intermediate goods imports (international
outsourcing), since their marginal impact on the industry PCM diﬀers in sign (compare
also the results between the parsimonious Models 2 and 3 in Table 2 on this). According
to Table 3, in both the full sample and the two subsample regressions the marginal eﬀect
of outsourcing is positive, signiÞcant at 1%, and robust with respect to outliers (compare
the median regression results at the bottom of Table 3), pointing to the relevance of
our theoretical model. According to our estimates, a one percentage point increase in
20For instance, the marginal impact of outsourcing on the PCM in our case is ∂PCMind,ijt/∂aOij(t−1) =
β7 + β8mij(t−1) + β9CR5i(t−1). Following Greene (1997), we use the average of mi and CR5i in the full
sample or the two subsamples, as reported in Table 1, to evaluate the eﬀect. Since the focus of our paper
lies on the impact of international outsourcing, the marginal eﬀect of this variable is shown in Table 3.
Marginal eﬀects of the other explanatory variables are discussed in detail below but are not separately
displayed in Table 3.
21In contrast to Co (2001), our data do not allow to distinguish between changes in multinational
activities due to greenÞeld investment and mergers and acquisitions. Co identiÞes a positive marginal
eﬀect of FDI in industries with low levels of concenration.
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outsourcing leads to an increase in the PCM of about 0.5 percentage points on average.
Aggregating over the two diﬀerent concepts of imports (Þnal and intermediate goods)
leads to upward biased estimates of the import-to-output parameters (compare Model 2
with Model 3 for all sample deÞnitions).22
> Table 3 <
With the regression results of Model 1 at hand, we can turn to a thought experiment,
where we try to isolate the impact of the change in outsourcing (i.e. intermediate goods
import) activity on PCMs between 1990 and 1997. Therefore, we obtain two diﬀerent
sets of model predictions on the basis of the parameter estimates of the three regressions
in Table 2. One, where we allow all variables (including the outsourcing-to-output ratio,
aOijt) to develop as observed, and a second, where we hold the outsourcing-to-output
ratio constant at its 1990 value in all industries and countries. The diﬀerence between the
observed and the simulated change in PCMs can then be interpreted as the contribution of
the outsourcing-to-output ratio change alone. Table 4 summarizes the simulation results.
> Table 4 <
First, we admit a reduction in the margins of both the high-PCM and the low-PCM
industry. On average, this reduction amounts to about 0.6 percentage points in our
sample. Between 1990 and 1997, international outsourcing rose by 0.78 percentage points
in the average industry and country. However, the change in outsourcing was quite
diﬀerent in the two subsamples. While outsourcing shrank by about 0.02 percentage points
in the high-PCM subsample, it rose by 1.56 percentage points in the low-PCM subsample.
In the second row of Table 4, we compute the diﬀerence between the model prediction with
outsourcing as observed (observed) and that one assuming outsourcing to be constant
at the level of 1990 (simulated). According to our results, the average industry PCM
22Our theoretical model would also suggest a positive coeﬃcient β8 of the interaction term
mi(t−1)aOij(t−1). This is in line with our Þndings for the high-PCM subsample. The respective pa-
rameter estimate for the low-PCM subsample is insigniÞcant.
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shrank by about 0.4 percentage point less because of the change in the outsourcing activity
in the 90s. Much of this is traceable to the increase in international outsourcing in the low-
PCM industries. The decline in the high-PCM industries outsourcing activity accounts
for a reduction in PCMs by 0.1 percentage points, while no change in outsourcing in the
low-PCM industries would have led to a further reduction in PCM by 0.5 percentage
points. Altogether, this suggests an outsourcing-induced convergence of PCMs to the
EU12 average in EU manufacturing between 1991 and 1998.
Table 4 presents three additional rows of results, which summarize the Þndings of an
analysis of variance of the observed - simulated change in PCMs. The corresponding
numbers are to be interpreted as the contribution of the mentioned dimensions of variance
(within industries and countries, between industries, between countries) to the overall
variance of the outsourcing-induced change in PCMs. Since we focus on the short run
(Þxed eﬀects) impact, it is not surprising that the within industries and countries variation
dominates. Additionally, we observe that outsourcing induces a considerable shift in
PCMs across industries, whereas the impact on the cross country distribution of PCMs
is only small and insigniÞcant.
4 Conclusions
This paper analyses the eﬀects of outsourcing on price-cost margins in the EU12. From a
model, where multinationals compete in quanities (Cournot) and other Þrms represent a
competitive fringe, we expect a positive relationship between the industry price cost mar-
gin and market concentration (of multinationals) on the one hand, and (for a given level
of multinationality) between the industry price-cost margin and international outsourcing
on the other hand. Based on insights of our theoretical analysis, we construct an empiri-
cal model to test our hypotheses in a panel of 66 (aggregates of NACE 3-digit) industries
and the EU12 countries in the 1990s, respectively. Due to the lack of data, we use an
industrys intermediate goods import to output ratio as a wide measure of international
outsourcing and we use Þnal goods imports as an additional control variable, motivated
17
by the imports-as-market-discipline hypothesis. The empirical Þndings strongly support
our theoretical hypotheses and underpin the importance of distinguishing between inter-
mediate goods (international outsourcing) and Þnal goods imports to obtain unbiased
estimates for both types of imports.
We undertake an experiment of thought to demonstrate the importance of outsourc-
ing. In the 90s, especially the low-margins industries engaged in international outsourcing
whereas we observe a decline in the outsourcing activity of the high-margins industries.
Price-cost margins in the average low-margins industry would have declined by 0.5 per-
centage points faster between 1991 and 1998 if the observed increase in international
outsourcing since 1990 had not taken place. Moreover, the reduction in international
outsourcing accounts for an additional decline in the EU12 high-margins industries by
about 0.1 percentage points. In that way, the observed change in outsourcing has induced
a convergence of EU12 industry price-cost margins and has led to a considerable shift
in the distribution of margins across industries rather than across countries. However,
for a deeper understanding of this convergence eﬀect of international outsourcing further
theoretical and empirical research is needed.
Appendix
DeÞne
Γ1 (q, aO, s,m, n,N) ≡ A− (n+ 1) bq
1 + bN
− ∂C (mq, aO, s)
∂ (mq)
= 0, (9a)
Γ2 (q, aO, s,m, n,N) ≡ ∂C (mq, aO, s)
∂aO
+ τ = 0. (9b)
according to (3) and (4). Then, the linearization of system (9) is23
∂Γ1 (·)
∂q
dq +
∂Γ1 (·)
∂aO
daO +
∂Γ1 (·)
∂s
ds+
∂Γ1 (·)
∂m
dm+
∂Γ1 (·)
∂n
dn+
∂Γ1 (·)
∂N
dN = 0,(10a)
∂Γ2 (·)
∂q
dq +
∂Γ2 (·)
∂aO
daO +
∂Γ2 (·)
∂s
ds+
∂Γ2 (·)
∂τ
dτ +
∂Γ2 (·)
∂m
dm = 0.(10b)
23According to system (9), we use ∂Γ1(·)∂τ =
∂Γ2(·)
∂n =
∂Γ2(·)
∂N = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Use dm = dn = dN = 0 and, in addition, dτ = 0 and apply Cramers rule to (10). Then,
we obtain
dq
ds
= −
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂s ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂s
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO

det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂q ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂q
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 . (11)
Use
∂Γ1 (·)
∂q
= −
µ
(n+ 1) b
1 + bN
+
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq)2
m
¶
,
∂Γ2 (·)
∂q
= m
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
, (12)
∂Γ1 (·)
∂aO
= − ∂
2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂aO
and
∂Γ2 (·)
∂aO
=
∂2C (·)
∂ (aO)
2 , (13)
to Þnd
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂q ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂q
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 = −µ(n+ 1) b
1 + bN
+
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq)2
m
¶
× ∂
2C (·)
∂ (aO)
2 (14)
+m
µ
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
¶2
.
According to the Euler theorem we can use
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq)2
= − aO
mq
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂aO
and (15)
∂2C (·)
∂ (aO)
2 = −
mq
aO
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
, (16)
so that (14) can be simpliÞed to
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂q ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂q
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 = (n+ 1) b
1 + bN
mq
aO
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂aO
< 0. (17)
Moreover, consider
∂Γ1
∂s
= − ∂
2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂s
, and
∂Γ2
∂s
=
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂s
, (18)
to obtain
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det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂s ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂s
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 = − ∂2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂s
∂2C (·)
∂ (aO)
2 +
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂aO
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂s
< 0 (19)
for the denominator of (11). Then, substituting (17) and (19) in (11) gives dq/ds < 0.
Moreover, due to
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂q ∂Γ1(·)∂s
∂Γ2(·)
∂q
∂Γ2(·)
∂s
 = −µ(n+ 1) b
1 + bN
+
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq)2
m
¶
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂t
+
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂t
m < 0,
(20)
daO/ds < 0 directly follows from (17), according to Cramers rule.
Use dq/ds < 0 in (5) to obtain dCR/ds < 0. Finally, use PCMmult = 1/ (n |ε|)
and note that |ε| = A−bnq
bnq
is declining in q to obtain dPCMmult/ds < 0 and therefore
dPCMind/ds < 0, according to (6).
Similarily, use dm = dn = dN = 0 and ds = 0, instead of dτ = 0. Moreover, note that
∂Γ1 (·)
∂τ
= 0 and
∂Γ2
∂τ
= 1, (21)
according to (10). Then,
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂τ ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂τ
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 = ∂2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂aO
< 0 (22)
implies dq/dτ < 0, according to (17) and Cramers rule. Moreover, due to
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂q ∂Γ1(·)∂τ
∂Γ2(·)
∂q
∂Γ2(·)
∂τ
 = −µ(n+ 1) b
1 + bN
+
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq)2
m
¶
< 0, (23)
daO/dτ < 0 directly follows from (17), according to Cramers rule.
Use dq/dτ < 0 in (5) to obtain dCR/dτ < 0. Finally, dPCMind/dτ < 0 is a direct con-
sequence of dPCMmult/dτ < 0, according to (6). This completes the proof of Proposition
1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Use ds = dτ = dn = dN = 0 in (10) and
∂Γ1
∂m
= − ∂
2C (·)
∂ (mq)2
q,
∂Γ2
∂m
=
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
q,
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according to (9), together with (12) to Þnd
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂m ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂m
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 = − ∂2C (·)
∂ (mq)2
∂2C (·)
∂ (aO)
2 q +
∂2C (·)
∂ (mq) ∂aO
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
q. (24)
According to (15) and (16), we then obtain
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂m ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂m
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 = 0. (25)
This implies dq/dm = 0, according to Cramers rule. Moreover, due to
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂q ∂Γ1(·)∂m
∂Γ2(·)
∂q
∂Γ2(·)
∂m
 = −(n+ 1) b
1 + bN
∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
q > 0 (26)
we Þnd that daO/dm > 0, according to (17) and Cramers rule.
Use dq/dm = 0 in (5) to Þnd dCR/dm = 0. Finally, use PCMmult = 1/ (n |ε|) and
note that d|ε|
dm
= d|ε|
dq
dq
dm
= 0 to obtain dPCMmult/dm = 0. Then, dPCMind/dm = 0,
follows, according to (6). This completes the proof of Proposition 2. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Use ds = dτ = dm = dN = 0 in (10) and note that
∂Γ1
∂n
= − bq
1 + bN
and
∂Γ2
∂n
= 0,
according to (9). Then,
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂n ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂n
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 = − bq
1 + bN
∂2C (·)
∂ (aO)
2 < 0 (27)
is an immediate consequence of (12). According to (17) and Cramers rule, we obtain
dq/dn < 0. Moreover, due to
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂q ∂Γ1(·)∂n
∂Γ2(·)
∂q
∂Γ2(·)
∂n
 = ∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
bq
1 + bN
m < 0 (28)
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it directly follows that daO/dn < 0.
Use the Euler theorem, according to (16), to obtain dq/dn = −q/ (n+ 1) from (17)
and (27). Then, we Þnd
dCR
dn
= −(1 + bN) q
¡
q + NA
n+1
¢
(nq +NA)2
< 0, (29)
according to (5). Moreover, use PCMmult = 1n|ε| and |ε| = A−bnqbnq to derive
dPCMmult
dn
= − |ε|+ n
d|ε|
dn
(n |ε|)2 = −
n
n+1
³
A
bnq
´
− 1³
nA−bnq
bnq
´2 . (30)
Then,
dPCMmult/dn S 0 iﬀ n |ε| T 1, (31)
according to (30). Use p
³
1− 1
n|ε|
´
= ∂C(·)
∂(mq)
, according to (3), to Þnd that n |ε| > 1 and
therefore dPCMmult/dn < 0, according to (31). Finally, be aware that
dPCMind
dn
=
·
CR+ n
dCR
dn
¸
PCMmult + n · CRdPCMmult
dn
, (32)
according to (6). Make use of·
CR+ n
dCR
dn
¸
1
CR
=
NA
(n+ 1) (nq +NA)
, (33)
according to (5) and (29) and note that
dPCMmult
dn
n
PCMmult
= −n (A− bnq)− bnq
(n+ 1) (A− bnq) , (34)
according to (30). Then,
dPCMind
dn
T 0, iﬀ NA
nq +NA
T n− 1|ε| . (35)
Now, use24
q =
A− (1 + bN) ∂C (·) /∂ (mq)
b (n+ 1)
, (36)
24Eq. (36) is not an explicit solution for the optimal output level q∗, since ∂C (·) /∂ (mq) is a function
of q.
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according to (3) to reformulate (35) as
bNA
·
A− n2 ∂C (·)
∂ (mq)
(1 + bN)
¸
T n2
·
A− ∂C (·)
∂ (mq)
(1 + bN)
¸
× ∂C (·)
∂ (mq)
(1 + bN) . (37)
Rearranging terms in (37) gives
A
A− ∂C (·) /∂ (mq)| {z }
e1
A
(1 + bN) ∂C (·) /∂ (mq)| {z }
e2
bN
1 + bN| {z }
e3
T n2, (38)
with e1 > 1, according to (3), e2 > 1, according to (36) and e3 < 1. Since e1 · e2 · e3 T n2
and, therefore, also the sign of dPCMind
dn
cannot be generally determined we use the following
(linearly homogenous) speciÞcation for cost function C (·):
C
³X
j
qkj , a
k
O; s
´
=
³P
j qkj
´2P
j qkj + aO
+ s
³P
j qkj
´
aOP
j qkj + aO
, s ∈ (0, 1) . (39)
In the symmetric equilibrium, the Þrst derivatives of C (·) with respect to q and aO are
given by
∂C (·)
∂mq
= 1− (1− s) a
2
O
(mq + aO)
2 , (40)
∂C (·)
∂aO
= −(1− s) (mq)
2
(mq + aO)
2 , (41)
respectively. Hence, we obtain ∂C(·)
∂(mq)
= 1 + ∂C
∂aO
³
aO
mq
´2
. In view of (4), it follows that
∂C(·)
∂(mq)
= 1− τ
³p
(1− s) /τ − 1
´2
. By substituting the latter expression in (39) it can be
shown that e1 ·e2 ·e3 T n2 and, therefore, also the sign of dPCMinddn critically depend on the
parameter values and are in general ambiguous.25 This completes the proof of Proposition
3. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Use dt = dτ = dm = dn = 0 in (10) and note that
∂Γ1
∂N
= − [A− b (n+ 1) q] b
(1 + bN)2
and
∂Γ2
∂N
= 0,
25The ambiguity in the sign of dPCMinddn has also been shown in a numerical experiment. The respective
parameter values and the progam code for Mathematica 5 are available from the authors upon request.
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according to (9). Then,
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂N ∂Γ1(·)∂aO
∂Γ2(·)
∂N
∂Γ2(·)
∂aO
 = − [A− b (n+ 1) q] b
(1 + bN)2
∂2C (·)
∂ (aO)
2 < 0. (42)
According to (17) and Cramers rule, we obtain dq/dN < 0. Moreover, due to
det
 ∂Γ1(·)∂q ∂Γ1(·)∂N
∂Γ2(·)
∂q
∂Γ2(·)
∂N
 = ∂2C (·)
∂aO∂ (mq)
[A− b (n+ 1) q] b
(1 + bN)2
m < 0 (43)
it directly follows that daO/dN < 0.
Use dq/dN < 0 in (5) to Þnd dCR/dN < 0. Finally, use PCMmult = 1/ (n |ε|) and
note that d|ε|
dN
= d|ε|
dq
dq
dN
> 0 to obtain dPCMmult/dN < 0. Then, dPCMind/dN < 0
follows, according to (6). This completes the proof of Proposition 4. ¥
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Table 1: Descriptrive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Price cost margin 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.04 1141.79 ***
Investment-output ratio 0.46 0.16 0.54 0.14 0.41 0.16 410.89 ***
Multinationality 0.60 0.14 0.60 0.14 0.59 0.14 34.27 ***
CR5 0.29 0.23 0.31 0.22 0.27 0.23 4.35 **
Final goods import-output ratio 0.78 4.07 0.59 1.15 0.93 5.28 0.28
Outsourcing 0.20 0.77 0.12 0.21 0.26 0.99 14.59 ***
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%. - a) Distributed as χ2(1).
High-Pcm = Low-PCM
Full sample High-PCM sample Low-PCM sample Kruskall-Wallis testa)
Table 2: Outsourcing, Structure and Price Cost Margins in the EU (1991-1994-1998)
Fixed Effects Regression Results
Dependent Variable is Industry Price Cost Margin
Explanatory Variablea) Model 2 Model 2 Model 2
Investment-output ratio (1) 0.309 *** 0.353 *** 0.449 *** 0.420 *** 0.473 *** 0.667 *** 0.287 *** 0.289 *** 0.335 ***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.034) (0.047) (0.044) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Multinationality (2) 0.005 -0.001 -0.014 0.096 -0.014 0.020 0.087 0.087 ** 0.092 **
(0.073) (0.076) (0.081) (0.106) (0.153) (0.162) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043)
Twice lagged multinationality (3) 0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.044 -0.009 -0.007 -0.028 -0.028 -0.033 *
(0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.039) (0.057) (0.061) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
CR5 (4) -0.014 -0.094 *** -0.015 -0.145 *** -0.161 ** -0.042 -0.006 -0.013 0.008
(0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.053) (0.063) (0.057) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Final goods import-output ratio (5) -0.600 *** -0.158 *** - -0.866 *** -0.290 *** - -0.004 -0.013 -
(0.111) (0.061) - (0.410) (0.042) - (0.041) (0.021) -
Interaction term (6): (4)*(5) -0.026 *** - - -0.005 - - -0.002 - -
(0.004) - - (0.007) - - (0.002) - -
Outsourcing (7) 0.490 *** 0.490 *** - 0.755 *** 0.660 *** - 0.328 *** 0.328 *** -
(0.041) (0.042) - (0.052) (0.075) - (0.029) (0.029) -
Interaction term (8): (2)*(7) 0.014 - - 0.099 ** - - -0.004 - -
(0.019) - - (0.046) - - (0.008) - -
Interaction term (9): (4)*(7) 0.089 *** - - 0.377 *** - - 0.005 - -
(0.021) - - (0.056) - - (0.009) - -
Total imports (final plus intermediate goods) (10): (5) + (7) - - -0.007 - - -0.090 ** - - 0.041 *
- - (0.066) - - (0.041) - - (0.023)
Constant -0.119 * -0.065 -0.027 -0.095 *** -0.028 -0.120 -0.149 *** -0.144 *** -0.095 ***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.067) (0.088) (0.123) (0.131) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036)
Number of Observations 2020 2020 2020 844 844 844 1176 1176 1176
Adj. R2 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99
Within R2 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.71 0.41 0.42 0.77 0.73 0.71
Time Effectsb) 5.96 *** 8.55 *** 11.50 *** 15.45 *** 5.32 *** 9.57 *** 14.65 *** 19.78 *** 13.69 ***
Country-Industry Effectsc) 8.36 *** 5.60 *** 4.80 *** 7.06 *** 3.11 *** 2.68 *** 11.71 *** 12.16 *** 9.65 ***
Hausman Testd) 192.18 *** 154.53 *** 12.40 * 185.85 *** 235.59 *** 118.31 *** 3351.18 *** 203.86 *** 387.07 ***
Model 2 versus Model 1e) 39.72 *** - - 198.96 *** - - 0.52 - -
Model 3 versus Model 1f) 32.84 *** - - 174.77 *** - - 1.50 - -
Model 3 versus Model 2g) - 11.21 *** - - 49.19 *** - - 4.42 ** -
Full Sample High PCM Low PCM
Model 1 Model 3 Model 3Model 3 Model 1 Model 1
a) Standard errors in parentheses. - b) Distributed as F(2,1328) for the full sample, as F(2,548) for the high-PCM sample and as F(2,769) for the low-PCM sample. - c) Distributed as F(680,1328) for the full sample, as F(284,548) for the high-PCM sample and
as F(395,769) for the low-PCM sample. - d) Distributed as χ2(11) in Model 1, χ2(8) in Model 2, and χ2(7) in Model 3. - e) Distributed as F(3,1328) for the full sample, as F(3,548) for the high-PCM sample and as F(3,769) for the low-PCM sample. - f) Distributed
as F(4,1328) for the full sample, as F(4,548) for the high-PCM sample and as F(4,769) for the low-PCM sample. - g) Distributed as F(1,1331) for the full sample, as F(1,551) for the high-PCM sample and as F(1,772) for the low-PCM sample.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 3: Marginal Effects of Outsourcing on Price Cost Margins in the EU (1991-1994-1998)
Based on Preferred Model 3 Parameters
Within estimator 0.507 *** 0.927 *** 0.327 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simultaneous quantiles regression (median)a) 0.556 *** 0.683 *** 0.373 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Marginal effect of outsourcing (evaluated at means):
Full Sample High PCM Low PCM
P-values in parentheses. - a) With 100 repetitions; regression results not reported. - * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 4: Assessing the Outsourcing Intensity Induced Change in PCM in EU12 Manufacturing (1991-1998)
Total manufacturing Full sample High-PCM sample Low-PCM sample
Observed percentage point change in PCM 1991-98 -0.646 -1.190 -0.283
Observed-simulated percentage point change in PCM 1991-98 0.359 *** -0.131 *** 0.515 ***
Analysis of variance of outsourcing-induced change in PCM:
     Within industries and countries in % 82.767 *** 81.714 *** 81.639 ***
     Between countries in % 1.581 1.818 1.859
     Between industries in % 15.652 *** 16.468 *** 16.501 ***
*** significant at 1%.
